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Abstract 
Contrà Dale Jamieson, the study of the metaethical foundations of 
environmental ethics may well lead students to a more environmentally 
responsible way of life. For although metaethics is rarely decisive in decision 
making and action, there are two kinds of circumstances in which it can play a 
crucial role in our practical decisions. First, decisions that have unusual 
features do not summon habitual ethical reactions, and hence invite the 
application of ethical precepts that the study of metaethics and ethical theory 
isolate and clarify. Second, there are times in which the good of others 
(including organisms and systems in the natural world) may well be given 
greater weight in one’s ethical deliberations if theory has made clear that the 
good to be promoted is ontologically independent of one’s own good. 
 
Keywords: Environmental ethics, environmental education, environmental 
value, metaethics, Dale Jamieson 
 
Introduction 
 
Classes in environmental ethics are increasingly common at the 
college level. Often, these classes focus on the question of the 
metaphysical status of the value or goodness to be ascribed to entities 
and systems in the natural world.2 Is value inherent in Nature? Does it 
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originate and exist in the mind of the one who recognizes the value? 
Are there other possibilities? 
Here I would like to discuss the role that such questions play in 
environmental education. The study of environmental philosophy is 
meant to stimulate critical reflection on the relationship between 
human beings and the natural environment. We may well think that 
this reflection will lead to better attitudes and actions in regard to the 
environment. Is this a reasonable belief? More specifically, does 
exploring philosophical questions concerning the source and 
ontological basis of value contribute to what many take to be the 
central task of classes in environmental ethics: cultivating the 
attitudes that lead to appropriate action in regard to the natural 
world?3 
An ethical theory clarifies the good to be promoted and 
identifies what a moral agent is obligated to do in the pursuit of this 
good. A metaethics grounds and justifies this ethical theory on the 
basis of an account of rationality, human nature and the larger world 
of which it is a part. A metaethics often employs a metaphysics, which 
discusses the underlying structures and realities that are responsible 
for the obligations that the ethical theory presents. But despite the fact 
that many Western ethical theories are grounded in metaphysical 
theory, the thesis that metaphysics can or should make a difference in 
the morality of our action is by no means uncontroversial. Dale 
Jamieson in particular has argued against this.4 I think that he is right 
to deemphasize the importance that metaphysical metaethics plays in 
people’s actual decisions and ways of life. I do however think that 
there are important exceptions to Jamieson’s view, and that one of 
these is environmental ethics, an area in which Jamieson has 
specialized. 
 The question of the metaphysical basis of value has had an 
important role to play in the emerging field of environmental ethics. 
Much ink has been spilt trying to show that natural things and systems 
have value in and of themselves, not to be understood as a means to 
the actualization of some other good, and not to be taken as always 
derived from a mental or emotional attitude that people take towards 
them, in order to show that there is a moral obligation to preserve 
them, regardless of whether they contribute to human interests.5 
Given the philosophical temper of our times, such speculation is wont 
to seem metaphysically extravagant, out of sync with the hard 
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sciences and smacking of mysticism. One might think “if 
environmental ethics rests on such dubious foundations, so much the 
worse for environmental ethics.” This is why Jamieson, with his special 
interest in the field, takes it upon himself to argue that environmental 
ethicists can be spending their time more productively than by arguing 
over metaphysics. I argue here that there are special features to the 
field of environmental ethics that give special importance to theorizing 
concerning the conceptual and ontological underpinnings of ethics. One 
need not explicitly engage in metaethics or metaphysics in order to 
have a worthy ethical attitude towards the natural world. But in this 
area, at any rate, such speculation has the potential for making a 
decisive difference in our praxis. 
 
Metaphysics and Ethics 
 
Metaphysics and ethics have long been intertwined. Ethical 
theory often explicitly rests on a metaphysical foundation, and the 
data of ethics are among the givens that form the raw material of 
metaphysical analysis. But to what extent is metaphysics involved in 
ethical deliberation and action? It seems that it has an important role 
to play only insofar as it has an essential role in ethical theory, and 
insofar as ethical theory plays an essential role in ethical judgment and 
decision making. But must one engage in ethical theory in order to act 
ethically? Perhaps only Plato, the Stoics and Kant set the bar so high. 
It is well known how Plato makes philosophy necessary for right 
action. From the earlier dialogues to the Republic, Socrates insists that 
one must have a special knowledge of the good, in order to achieve 
what is good. For the Stoics, right action is possible only for the sage, 
whose mind penetrates the underlying logos of the cosmos. For this 
reason, Stoics were forced to admit that almost all, if not all, human 
beings were fools and acted accordingly. Kant, on the other hand, was 
more optimistic concerning the abilities of unschooled everyday 
reason. For Kant, ethical action is rational action, and necessarily 
involves an application of the Categorical Imperative, but this is not an 
application of theory and does not require of the agent any excursion 
into metaethics. Other Western ethical philosophical traditions also 
seem less committed to the role played by ethical theory and its 
metaphysical foundation as prerequisites for ethical action. To be sure, 
Aristotle tells us that a theoretical account of the human good gives us 
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a target at which to aim (NE I.2), but this may be a glance at either 
the political implications of the ethics (since a leader needs to clearly 
see the telos of the community) or Book 10’s encouragement of the 
contemplative life, neither a fundamental part of the everyday morality 
of the private citizen. Rather, for most people the moral life comes 
through the ethical habituation that results from obeying the law and 
following the example of the phronimos, the person of practical 
wisdom. This is similarly the case in Natural Law theory, whose 
underlying metaphysics is more involved and has a more explicit role 
to play in ethical theory than that of Aristotle’s ethics from which it is 
largely derived. Finally, ethical theories such as that of Hume or 
classical utilitarianism which ground ethics on human sentiment hold 
that the study of ethical theory may refine our sentiments and render 
them consistent with each other, but cannot serve to instill the core 
sentiments of fellow-feeling that underlie morality. Such theories often 
explicitly dispense with metaphysical speculation, since the core moral 
sentiments are taken as empirically given and not to be justified by 
any more basic account. 
For this reason, it appears that Jamieson is battling something 
of a straw man; to dissuade us from overemphasizing the issue of the 
metaphysical foundations of value in nature, he writes that ethical 
realists understand metaethics “as some immaculate conception that 
sits in judgment of our practices” or “part of a reforming philosophical 
project . . . philosophy run amok.”6 Jamieson tells us that “philosophy, 
understood as the appreciation of, and reflection on, our practices, 
leaves the world alone. It may inform and incline our thoughts, but it 
cannot determine them.”7 Platonists, Cynics, and Stoics aside, no 
major figure in the Western philosophical tradition has thought 
otherwise (except insofar as the activity of philosophy itself is taken to 
be constitutive of the good life). Engaging in metaethics or 
metaphysics has rarely been taken to be required for living in a decent 
manner. More particularly, it would be astonishing to claim that a class 
in environmental ethics is a prerequisite for the cultivation of 
ecologically responsible habits. 
However, even if one can act perfectly morally without expertise 
in metaphysics, I can imagine three kinds of cases in which people’s 
actions can be affected by virtue of engaging in ethical theory and 
metaethics. These are worth mentioning, even though in the first two 
kinds of cases it is not philosophical thought as such that is decisive, 
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and hence these do not dislodge Jamieson’s point concerning the 
impracticality of theories concerning the ontology of value.  
(1) If we antecedently assume that consistency is a good for 
which we should strive, ethical theory is useful in making sure that our 
judgments are consistent. We may give up or alter an ethical 
judgment when we see that it is inconsistent with other judgments or 
beliefs to which we are committed. This is the stuff of Socratic 
elenchus, and at their best we see this sort of thing in our introductory 
ethics classes. Students who are committed to certain ethical 
principles can be led to see that they implicitly clash with certain 
judgments they make. This can lead people to revise these judgments 
and to make different choices. But typically in such a case the students 
come to isolate and apply foundational ethical precepts, and to identify 
certain goods and duties at a general level. Discussion need not 
extend to the level of metaphysical analysis, explaining what it is 
about the world that makes these goods desirable and gives these 
duties their binding character. 
For example, one might be led to see that the right to life 
entails a right to a modicum of health care, and one’s political 
allegiances could conceivably change as a result of such an argument. 
But how would this depend on a metaphysical account of human 
nature that explains what it is about human beings that gives them a 
right to life? Similarly, students who already take cruelty to animals to 
be a moral evil can be shown that certain practices in factory farming, 
or even purchasing food that derives from such practices, is 
inconsistent with their initial assumptions. Those who already value 
biodiversity can be shown that this ethical commitment is incompatible 
with the typical American lifestyle. But such reflection does not rest on 
investigating the theoretical foundations of value. To show consistency 
or inconsistency in a set of views does not depend on any particular 
theoretical grounding of ethics—all that is required is an account of 
principles and basic precepts, and the ability to think logically. 
(2) An ethical theory may have certain pragmatic value that is 
to a certain extent independent of its philosophical value. It was Plato, 
in the Laws, who first suggested that philosophy is not only for 
philosophers—the very fact that an already respected authority 
presents a logos (argument) in support of a rule makes a citizen more 
inclined to follow and uphold that rule, even though he or she is not 
capable of fully understanding that argument.8 In this way, a priest 
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might argue for a certain moral view on the basis of Natural Law 
theory. The argument may be only half-understood by his 
congregants, but the very fact that the argument is there may give the 
position greater weight than it would have had only on the basis of the 
priest’s personal or ecclesiastical authority. Similarly, the Talmud rests 
on a metaphysics (not all of which can be supported on strictly 
philosophical grounds). As an observant Jew, my study of Talmud can 
motivate me in adhering to Jewish law with greater diligence than 
I would simply on the basis of rabbinical authority unsupported by 
argument. This is so in spite of the rudimentary nature of my 
understanding of Talmudic reasoning. This is because arguing for a 
conclusion is a powerful rhetorical device for persuading others of that 
conclusion. The fuller the argument (that is, the greater the extent 
that it is based only on agreed-upon premises), and the more it is 
adequately understood, the more convincing the argument is. This is 
so, even if, as is always (or nearly always) the case, the argument is 
not fully grasped, from its foundations through its intervening steps. 
If I understand Jamieson correctly, it is here that one finds 
metaethics to have some pragmatic value. Ontological claims are 
made in order to provide foundations and fill in the gaps found in 
ethical argumentation. An argument containing as an unsupported 
premise the claim that others ought to value some entity or state of 
affairs is less full than one that grounds this premise in some general 
ontology. In so arguing, we speak in a way that reifies our act of 
valuing and presents the value found as something independent of 
that act, and accordingly as something to be considered in everyone’s 
ethical deliberations, regardless of perspective or interests. We do this 
as a rhetorical ploy, to get others to act as we would like them to, for 
we are suggesting that the value is “out there,” available for them too 
to recognize, if only they would see. An ethical theory, which pretends 
to take this value as its object and study it apart from the 
psychological and social conditions of the acts of valuing that give rise 
to it, is part of this same rhetorical enterprise.9 Thus, Jamieson writes: 
“In everyday life, we commit acts of metaethics when reflective 
thought, unreflective argument, or the simple pressure of serious 
disagreement takes us to the brink of a rhetorical abyss. At such 
moments we employ metaethical strategies in the service of our 
practical ends.”10 It cannot be denied that discussion of the 
metaphysical bases of ethical theory can play this role, sometimes 
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effectively. In cases of this kind, too, it is not the metaphysics behind 
the theory that gives it its practical import, except insofar as those 
argument fragments that are comprehended make the whole account 
more persuasive. In this way, a student might only half-understand 
the arguments behind the land ethic, but the air of authority and the 
persuasive manner of a teacher of environmental ethics who lays out 
the theoretical foundations of the land ethic may predispose the 
student to accept it, and the parts of the argument that the student 
does understand may be decisive in her coming to say to herself 
“Makes sense to me.” She may come to call herself an adherent of the 
land ethic, something that might never have happened had she not sat 
through lectures and discussions covering material she inadequately 
grasps. This may well be decisive in later leading the student to avoid 
applying pesticides on her lawn, and so forth. 
(3) I should not omit to mention the kind of thing that we see in 
Plato’s dialogues, and that hopefully goes on in our classes, including 
those in environmental ethics. Through leading students to engage in 
the activity of philosophical reflection (including metaethical reflection) 
students can learn for themselves that this activity is intrinsically 
valuable, and it may come to form part of their conception of the good 
life. This may indeed lead to some practical decisions: from the 
decision to join a philosophy reading group to devoting one’s life to 
metaphysics. But, on the face of it, this does not seem different from 
the practical implications of being introduced to fine French cuisine. To 
show otherwise requires the sort of theoretical argumentation whose 
practical value is at issue. 
(4) There is one more kind of case in which a metaphysical 
metaethics can conceivably lead to the making of new and more 
enlightened decisions. I suspect that it is this sort of case that both the 
champions and detractors of the practicality of metaphysical 
metaethics have in mind in their disputes. One may accept an ethical 
theory, with all of its metaphysical framework, on the merits of 
supporting arguments, which are indeed adequately understood. Then 
one may come to make certain ethical judgments on account of the 
fact that this theory demands it. The theory itself may be responsible 
for ethical choices. Thus an argument based on an ethical theory may 
lead to an unanticipated conclusion—it is at least imaginable that a 
slaveowner may have seen the error of his ways as a result of reading 
Kant closely and carefully. Further, when ethical obligations come in 
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conflict, a theory can help prioritize ethical demands. An example 
might be an intricate argument applying the Thomistic doctrine of 
double effect to an ethical dilemma. It is my contention that this 
happens rarely, with important exceptions. One exception is the area 
of environmental ethics. 
I do not here set for myself the task of proving the negative 
claim, concerning the rarity of case number 4. Nietzscheans and other 
antitheorists are better able to do this than I am. Besides, as I have 
mentioned, few such cases are attested within the Western 
philosophical tradition. Here I aim to argue that the area of 
environmental ethics has distinctive characteristics, so that the sort of 
metaphysical reflection that is invited by ethical thought experiments 
may be decisive in the formulation of new ethical judgments. 
 
Metaphysical Reflection and Environmental Ethics 
 
I begin with a thought experiment that has become something 
of a chestnut in the area of environmental ethics. I lay it out not in 
order to adequately evaluate whether it is successful in isolating a 
“metaphysical intuition” concerning the value of the natural world (I 
think it is) but in order to explore its purported role as foundational to 
an environmental ethics that makes a real difference in practice.  
The thought experiment I would like to consider was formulated 
by Richard Routley at the dawn of environmental philosophy as such.11 
Imagine a last man, who takes it in his head to destroy the living 
things and ecosystems that would otherwise survive him. Our 
immediate unreflective response would be to say that there would be 
something very wrong about this. Thus, Routley argues, our thought 
experiment shows that nonhuman beings have inherent value. There is 
a goodness to them that is not dependent on the thought processes of 
an evaluator; for, in the situation under consideration, the evaluator is 
absent from the scene. Routley argued that, insofar as traditional 
Western ethics is not able to account for this value, it is deficient, and 
ethics needs a new foundation. Thus environmental ethics as a 
distinctive discipline is born. 
There are various ways of countering Routley’s claim, and 
various ways in which it can be defended, some of which Routley 
himself offered to critics both potential and actual. I have much to say 
on this, which I hope to soon offer the community of environmental 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Worldviews, Vol 8, No. 2-3 (June 2004): pg. 185-197. DOI. This article is © Brill Academic Publishers and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Brill Academic Publishers does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Brill 
Academic Publishers. 
9 
 
ethicists. But I here avoid such ontological speculation, since my 
present task is to wonder what effect such exploration has on actual 
conduct. More specifically, what effect could a college philosophy class 
in which such metaphysical argumentation plays a dominant role have 
on the actual behavior of students taking it? Could it conceivably lead 
to a more environmentally responsible life, after the examinations and 
paper assignments are long forgotten? 
Suppose that someone finds Routley’s argument philosophically 
convincing. What has happened? A thought experiment shows that 
certain things are good independent of human valuation and hence 
shows the inadequacy of a metaethics that denies this. Accordingly, an 
alternative ethical theory is required, which gives some ontological 
status to such goodness. This theory both posits value outside of the 
human realm (a move with which Jamieson and Callicott have no 
objection) and takes the source of that value to lie outside of the 
human realm (which these two authors deny). Hence, one adopts the 
new ethical theory and its metaphysical commitments because it has 
greater explanatory power than its rivals. 
The metaphysical speculation at issue is not a prerequisite for 
finding noninstrumental value in nature. Rather, the thought 
experiment is prior to such speculation, and shows that we do find 
such value in nature, regardless of any metaphysical thought or 
theorizing concerning the source of this value. In everyday life, we 
may well have made decisions to preserve such value, whether 
through practicing organic gardening, keeping on the trails to prevent 
erosion, or giving money or time to an environmental cause. But such 
decisions could well have been made in the interests of human beings: 
who is clear about his motives? The thought experiment is meant to 
provide some clarity here, by postulating a case in which the decision 
cannot be made for the sake of people who take an actual interest in 
the bearers of goodness, since by hypothesis there are no people to 
take such an interest. Yes, this is an extreme case, of a sort that 
people will not encounter in their day to day decision making, the sort 
of science fiction example to which teachers of introductory ethics too 
often resort. But these cases have their use: they provide what the 
real world does not, ways of imaginatively abstracting decisions from 
surrounding circumstances. If one is trying to prove that a certain 
factor X is (or can be) decisive in ethical decision-making, one strains 
to set up an example where another factor Y, which is often taken to 
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be decisive, cannot be not operative. (For example, in our introductory 
ethics classes we set up implausible examples where using another as 
a mere means, through the infliction of pain, would without question 
be for the greatest good for the greatest number, an evaluation always 
questionable in the real world, in order to prove the Kantian principle 
that one ought not use another rational being merely as a means.) 
Here, a principle to be demonstrated is that natural beings have value 
or worth that is not dependent or derivative on the activity of valuing, 
and this is done by setting up the example in such a way that the 
possibility of an evaluator is excluded. To be sure, even if one accepts 
the results of the thought experiment, the theory that one is 
committed to is somewhat minimal. All that has been shown is that 
there is value in the natural world that is not dependent on the activity 
of valuing. It is left to further theorizing to say what the bearer of this 
value is (individual organism? ecosystems?), and what it is about the 
world that is responsible for it. The nature of value is unclear, and 
nothing is revealed concerning its relation to naturalistic properties. 
Similarly nothing is said about our epistemological access to them. 
Still, the existence of such value is an ontological claim, one that is 
quite explicitly a piece of metaphysics. Admittedly, the thought 
experiment raises a swarm of further metaphysical and 
epistemological problems, but metaphysical accounts need to start 
somewhere, and the existence of value that is neither anthropocentric 
nor anthropogenic, indicated by the kind of thought experiment that 
Routley explores, is at least a possible metaphysical principle. 
I claim that in this case, when a new ethical theory is in place, 
with the metaethical commitment to value in nature ontologically 
independent of human valuation, judgments will be made that would 
otherwise not have been made. This has a real effect in regard to our 
personal decisions and public policy decisions. Consider for example 
public policy debates concerning wilderness preservation. It is true 
that one does not need a metaphysical account of value as inherent in 
natural systems and the living things within them, in order to see that 
wilderness preservation can be a good thing. One may find pleasure in 
the knowledge that a bit of wilderness exists, apart from any 
theorizing. Wilderness can be valued on instrumental grounds: it is 
good for the psychological wellbeing of a country’s citizens, it provides 
an irreplaceable kind of pleasure that would rank high on the kind of 
qualitative scale we see in Mill, it preserves species that may have 
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unanticipated uses, it is good for clean air, clean water, and so forth. 
But on such an account the question of how much wilderness to 
preserve quickly becomes one of balancing these goods with other 
goods whose value arises from human thought and desire. To be sure, 
such prudential balancing would be required even if we were to 
recognize value that things in the natural world have in themselves, 
regardless of whether or not their worth is recognized or recognizable 
by evaluators. But in those cases in which we know that there are few 
people with enough awareness to enable us to say that they truly 
value what is at issue (for example, vast stretches of the Arctic 
National Wildlife Reserve, which for most people exist only as blank 
areas on a map) citizens may well make different decisions, by virtue 
of their new explicitly theoretical commitments. The matter at hand 
may call to mind the principle that wilderness has value, and that it 
follows that public policy must take account of this. The situation 
stands in contrast to a public policy matter that concerns human 
beings alone. There we are on more familiar ethical ground. Our 
desires to clothe the poor and feed the hungry are familiar responses 
to certain kinds of situations, as are our desires to inculcate self-
reliance and practice fiscal responsibility. How to balance competing 
ethical demands is a matter of prudential judgment. But an explicit 
ethical theory, with all of its metaphysical underpinning, will rarely be 
the occasion for the judgments made here. This is because the 
situations are not so unusual or unfamiliar as to immediately call to 
mind the ethical theorizing to which one has been exposed, in however 
fragmentary a form. 
A similar sort of example is that which concerns citizens and 
policymakers in the areas of food and reproductive technologies. 
Ought crops to be genetically modified? To be sure, such cases lend 
themselves to standard consequentialist analyses. Is the food safe? 
What will happen as the variety of seed stock is diminished? But some 
who consider the prospect of a tomato with the genes of a pig, say, 
may initially experience revulsion, and this may occasion the 
realization that living things belong to kinds with an integrity that has 
noninstrumental value. To be sure, revulsion is notoriously unreliable 
as a moral guide. More often than not it arises from prejudice and 
superstition, rather than a sensitive moral compass. Again, my 
question is not whether a line of metaphysical metaethical thinking is 
sound, but whether it can have a real role to play in our practical 
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decisions. It seems clear to me that the sort of revulsion that many 
have in considering the prospect of so-called “Frankenfoods” can be 
the occasion for explicitly metaphysical thinking concerning the value 
of biological species, and how this is to be understood from an 
ecological perspective. One is led to reflect on whether we ascribe 
goodness to individuals that belong to certain kinds, or to the kind 
itself, or the ecosystem in which it plays a role, given some ontological 
standing. This kind of metaphysical thinking can be decisive in one’s 
rejection of less dramatic forms of genetic alteration in agriculture. 
Were one to start by considering the issue of the ethical permissibility 
of altering a crop to make it less susceptible to drought, one would 
probably find it permissible. It is the imaginative thought experiment 
of the unusual case that focuses attention on the metaphysical thesis 
concerning the value of biological kinds, and such attention leads to a 
moral precept that is adopted and employed in all cases that one takes 
to be applicable.12 
Now in this case an anti-metaphysical “out” is available: one 
could always say in response to the revulsion occasioned by certain 
products of genetic engineering or other reproductive technologies that 
all that our feelings show is that we do not like these things.13 
Accordingly, one could argue that the disvalue or evil that we think is 
present is merely a matter of our own distress. Routley sets up his 
thought experiment to try to render such a suggestion inapplicable. 
Again, whether he does so successfully is controversial, and it is not 
my present task to defend him here. I merely want to maintain the 
practical value of his work. The metaphysical implications of Routley’s 
ethical thought experiment are clearer than those that rest on 
imaginative explorations of monstrosities brought about by genetic 
engineering. Even those who share a moral revulsion at the prospects 
of various forms of genetically engineered organisms are in principle 
able to account for them as their feelings, worthy of moral 
consideration only as feelings among other feelings, and hence such as 
can be counterbalanced by the preferences of others. But if an 
argument effectively concludes that living things and the natural 
systems of which they form a part have intrinsic value that is not 
ontologically dependent on the valuer, one who follows that argument 
is less likely to take this value to be outweighed by the preferences of 
others. 
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Conclusion 
 
I conclude that although the sort of metaphysical accounts that 
underlie ethical theorizing are rarely decisive in decision-making and 
action, there are two kinds of circumstances in which such accounts 
can play a crucial role in practical decisions. First are those decisions 
that have unusual features that do not summon habitual ethical 
reactions and hence invite the application of theoretical ethical 
precepts that the study of metaethics and ethical theory isolate and 
clarify. Second, there are times in which the good of others (including 
organisms and systems in the natural world) is not to be analyzed as 
one’s own good. In such a case, this good may well be given greater 
weight in one’s ethical deliberations. This is why, contra Jamieson, 
students who study the purported ontological foundations of 
environmental ethics may well come to live in a more environmentally 
responsible manner. Metaphysics is not a perquisite for the recognition 
of ethical obligations to the natural world for its own sake. But it can 
help. 
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Notes 
1. Acknowledgments: I am grateful for the incisive comments of Dale 
Jamieson and an anonymous referee, and to Arun Iyer for editorial 
help. 
2. See the Environmental Ethics Syllabus Project at 
http://appliedphilosophy.mtsu.edu/ISEE/ 
3. My focus here is whether individual reflection, of the sort encouraged by 
classes in philosophical ethics, has an effect on individual conduct. This 
question is different from (though related to) the question of the 
extent to which a society’s general philosophical or cultural outlook 
determines or influences the actions of members of that society. Yi-Fu 
Tuan has expressed scepticism on the latter issue, see Tuan 1971. 
4. I focus on Jamieson 2002: 225-43. 
5. For the debates on this issue, see for example Rolston 1989, Callicott 1985 
and the papers collected in The Monist 1992, Vol. 75, No. 2: The 
Intrinsic Value of Nature. 
6. Ibid.: 232. 
7. Ibid.: 243. 
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8. At Laws 721e-723d, the Athenian Stranger argues that laws ought to be 
prefaced by preludes which give the reasoning behind the law, so as to 
better persuade the citizens that they are to be obeyed. The preludes 
are to be written even though they may delve into abstruse 
metaphysics (as is the case for the long theological prelude of Laws 
10) and, as the Stranger recognizes, most of the citizenry will be 
unable to fully understand the reasoning they present (722b). On this, 
see Bobonich 1999. 
9. Jamieson 2002: 235-6. 
10. Ibid.: 232 
11. Routley and Routley 1980. 
12. Cf. the “heuristics of fear” discussed in Jonas 1984. 
13. Such an identification of nonhuman bearers of value, which falls short of 
moral realism, may well have some impact on moral judgment but, I 
am arguing, when it is given some ontological grounding it is afforded 
significant protection against being outweighed by the moral 
consideration of human desires. 
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